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Indonesia's retreat from East Timor 
The announcement by the Indonesian government that it is prepared to pull out of East Timor 
came like a thunderbolt, although close observers had seen signs that change might be in the air. 
The economic meltdown and the worsening political crisis have forced Jakarta to re-assess its East 
Timor policy. While independence now seems closer, a backlash by pro-integration para-military 
forces is spreading death and terror in East Timor which means that it's too early yet to celebrate. 
The announcement came on 27 January, following a 
cabinet meeting. Information minister Yunus Y osfiah, ac-
companied by foreign minister Ali Alatas, announced that 
a meeting of the politics and security ministers chaired by 
the president, B.J. Habibie, had decided that if the East 
Timorese people were not prepared to accept Indonesia's 
offer of wide-ranging autonomy, the government would 
ask the meeting of the People's Consultative Assembly, the 
MPR, later this year to 'let East Timor go'. 
People in East Timor received the news with cautious 
optimism and a heavy dose of scepticism as 23 years of 
hardship and misery have taught them to be suspicious of 
any good news emanating from Jakarta. 
It is ironic that it fell to retired general Yun us Y osfiah 
to make the announcement. He served for many years as a 
combat soldier in East Timor, better informed than most 
about the army's failure to impose Indonesian rule. As 
military commander, he tried without success for many 
years to implement a 'hearts and minds' policy. He is also 
deeply implicated in the murder of five TV journalists in 
Balibo in October 1975, who were killed by a unit under 
his command. But as the country's first post-Suharto min-
ister of information it also fell to him to usher in an era of 
press freedom, thanks to which the Indonesian press gave 
extensive coverage to the surprise announcement and its 
implications. East Timor was on all the front pages for 
days with photos of the East Timorese leader, Xanana 
Gusmao, receiving distinguished visitors in Cipinang 
Prison. Photos of Xanana, Bishop Ximenes Belo and even 
the much maligned Jose Ramos-Horta have graced the 
covers of most political magazines and tabloids. 
Xanana place under 'house arrest' 
At the same time, the government took another impor-
tant step forward in deciding to move Xanana Gusmao 
from Cipinang Prison, where he is still serving a 20-year 
sentence, to a private house. Since the authorities claim 
that Indonesian law does not recognise the status of house 
arrest, his new residence was declared to be an extension of 
the prison where he would be under 24-hour guard by the 
security forces. 
But after refusing for years to countenance his release 
on the grounds that he was a 'criminal', it was now made 
clear that his move from prison had been made in response 
to persistent international pressure, above all from the UN 
secretary-general, Kofi Annan, and to enable him to play 
an active part in consultations regarding a peaceful solution 
of the East Timor question. According to Justice Minister 
Muladi, the move would give him far greater freedom to 
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contact people and stay in touch with developments.As the 
undisputed leader of the Timorese resistance, Xanana will 
now be able to take a much more direct part in negotiations 
with Indonesia, with the different strands of opinion in East 
Timorese society and with the UN and other key interna-
tional agencies involved in the process. 
~~~~~~~~=-
Xanana in a minivan being moved to his new 'prison' 
Speaking at a press conference in Cipinang shortly be-
fore the transfer, Xanana welcomed the change in the In-
donesian Government's policy, praised President Habibie 
for his courage and stressed the fact that the Indonesian 
government had for the first time ever recognised Timor's 
right to self determination . 
Xanana's transfer from prison was a major international 
news event. Within hours of his move, Xanana was re-
ceiving a stream of visitors to discuss ways to take the is-
sue forward and in particular to end the violence in East 
Timor and seek reconciliation. His new 'prison' is now 
such a hive of activity that it is as if the East Timorese re-
sistance has opened a de facto office in the heart of enemy 
territory. 
The new policy and the UN 
The decision in Jakarta came in the midst of continuing 
negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal under the 
auspices of the UN secretary-general. These talks revolve 
around an Indonesian proposal for wide-ranging autonomy 
hedged by the condition that once this is accepted, the in-
ternational community will accept East Timor's integration 
into Indonesia. This has been countered by Portugal and 
the CNRT who insist that, if accepted, autonomy must be a 
transitional stage, leading ultimately to a referendum. 
The 27 January announcement fudged the question of 
how the East Timorese will be assessed as having accepted 
or rejected autonomy and Alatas continues to insist that 
there can be no referendum. It has been suggested by some 
people in the government that the matter could be resolved 
at the forthcoming general elections, that the elected repre-
sentatives from East Timor will convey their views to the 
MPR when it meets in November. If they say no to auton-
omy, the MPR will let East Tim or go. 
But this scenario completely overlooks the fact that t_he 
decision on East Timor's future rests with the UN, not with 
Indonesia' s MPR. Both Secretary-General Kofi An~an and 
his special envoy, Jamsheed Marker, have pubhcly. ac-
knowledged that the majority of the people of East T1~or 
favour independence. The question is, to find a mechamsm 
to record this as an indisputable fact. 
The response of UN secretary-general Kofi . Annan to 
this conundrum was to call an immediate meetmg of the 
two countries' foreign ministers, to seek clarifications from 
Jakarta about how it intended to proceed. A proposal from 
Portugal for a UN-supervised consultation of East 
Timorese opinion to be held by August this year w~ flatly 
rejected by Alatas. By declaring that this consultat10n ~as 
a referendum 'in all but name', the Portuguese foreign 
minister appears to have stiffened Alatas' rejection, and the 
foreign ministers departed from New York with the matter 
unresolved. Diplomatic sources now believe that it will be 
up to the UN to work out a form of consultation . that is 
valid internationally and acceptable to Jakarta as bemg not 
remotely like a referendum. Perhaps when the foreign 
ministers meet again in March, a solution will be found. 
Divisions within the elite 
The policy change was not unanimously welcomed, 
even within the government. The key minister in charge of 
the issue for more than ten years, Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas,could hardly conceal his embarrassment as he faced 
the press with Yunus Yosfiah on 27 January. It later be-
came clear that he had hardly been consulted about the 
shift. Another senior minister, retired General Feisal 
Tandjung, the Coordinating Minister for Security and Po-
litical Affairs, was also not pleased with the change. But 
key ministers including Minister of Defence General Wi-
ranto and economic czar Ginandjar Kartasasmita expressed 
full support. For Ginandjar, this could pave the way for 
desperately needed foreign economic assistance, without 
which the Indonesian economy will never recover. For Wi-
ranto, it meant one problem less for his heavily-stretched 
forces, facing riots and unrest on an unprecedented scale. 
For many years Alatas has described East Timar as 'a 
pebble in the shoe'. This is of course an understatement 
because Indonesian embassies around the world have had 
their work cut out trying to defend the indefensible position 
of justifying the Indonesian occupation of East Timar. 
Even before the downfall of Suharto, it was clear that sen-
ior diplomats were becoming ever more reluctant to defend 
the annexation of East Tim or against challenges in virtually 
every international forum. 
At the same time, many Indonesian intellectuals started 
to challenge Indonesian colonialism in East Timor whether 
on grounds of principle or because of the high cost of the 
policy in economic as well as diplomatic terms. 
Added to all this is the fact that public opinion in Indo-
nesia has become more critical, as the true facts about East 
Timor have begun to emerge. The birth in the past year of 
two Indonesian solidarity groups with East Timor has 
helped popularise the issue. Their books, seminars and ex-
hibitions have helped transform East Timor from being 
taboo to becoming a matter of great public interest. 
Habibie turns the tables 
But ultimately, it was Habibie, egged on by his senior 
political adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar, who took the 
plunge. For a president who has proven incapable of re-
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solving the mounting problems which he inherited from 
Suharto, here was one area in which he proved decisive. 
This decision may be the one that will earn him a place of 
honour in the history books, alongside people like P.W. 
Botha who abandoned apartheid. 
It was the more liberal wing in ICMI, the Muslim In-
tellectuals Organisation which Habibie chaired from the 
outset until he became president, that played the crucial 
role in the policy switch. For some time Dewi Fortuna, 
who some see as the country's real foreign minister, has 
publicly expressed criticism of the annexation of East 
Tim or. She has become exasperated with the repeated 
challenges she has had to face at international conferences, 
forcing her to defend a policy she did not support. 
Now she makes no secret of her mistrust of ABRI. Re-
ferring to the need to disarm para-militaries (see below), 
she said the job should be borne by the international com-
munity. 'With its morale currently at a low ebb, Indone-
sia's 500,000 strong military cannot be relied on to do the 
job because it is not regarded as neutral.' [International 
Herald Tribune, 17 February] 
But a glance at Habibie's own political career shows 
that East Timor has played no role in his advance from an 
aerospace engineer in Germany to the supremo of Indone-
sia's military-industrial complex, nor indeed in his personal 
and family fortunes. He freely admits that it was strong 
international pressure that persuaded him to reverse Ja-
karta's inflexible position on East Timor. First and fore-
most, it was the shock decision in January by the Austra-
lian government to acknowledge, after having given de jure 
recognition to Indonesia's annexation, that East Timor did 
have the right to an act of self-determination, that con-
vinced Habibie that it was time for a change. As he himself 
made clear, Prime Minister John Howard's letter informing 
him of the switch was the final straw. 
All of Habibie's utterances on the question assume that 
the East Timorese will reject autonomy, paving the way for 
Indonesia to leave. He makes no secret of the fact that he 
sees East Timor as a 'burden' on the Indonesian economy 
and the quicker Jakarta is rid of it, the better. 
And what about ABRI? 
But the Habibie initiative could never have been taken 
without the backing of the top ABRI generals. It was ABRI 
that invaded East Timor on Suharto's orders and East 
Timor has been an ABRI project ever since. 
After Wiranto had given his blessing following the first 
announcement, Major General Syamsul Ma'arif, the armed 
forces spokesperson, declared on 2 February that ABRI 
was 'ready to leave East Timor. If the people want ABRI 
to leave East Timor,' he said, 'it will do so.' He even 
claimed that ABRJ did not have its own agenda in East 
Timor. Later that day, commander-in-chief General Wi-
ranto said that Indonesian troops would gradually be with-
drawn from East Timor, while admitting frankly that the 
troop deployment had increased in the past few months in 
order, he claimed, to cope with the rising level of activity 
by pro-independence groups. It must be said that there is 
no evidence of this. 
With the exception of Johnny Lumintang who is now 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the army, none of the generals 
holding key positions in Cilangkap, ABRI head-quarters, 
has served for any length of time in East Timor. Until re-
cently, the career prospects of army officers have been 
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largely determined by a tour of combat duty in East Timor 
but this is no longer true. 
However, a number of retired generals have made no 
secret of their anger with Cilangkap. The most outspoken 
opinion was voiced by retired Colonel Gatot Purwanto who 
was chief intelligence officer in East Timor at the time of 
the Santa Cruz massacre. He bitterly accused Wiranto of 
being an officer 'who has never seen service in Timor, who 
has spent too much time carrying other people's briefcases 
and who knows nothing about the sufferings of the ordi-
nary soldier'. 
Indonesia letting East Timor go 
It is widely acknowledged that 20,000 soldiers have lost 
their lives in East Timor. In the first I 0 years alone, the 
army is thought to have lost 15,000 men. Leaving East 
Timor was seen by many hardliners as a betrayal of these 
sacrifices. But with its backs to the wall on many fronts, 
ABRI was hardly in a position to stand out against a policy 
that accepted the reality of Indonesia's hard-pressed eco-
nomic and political situation on the world arena. 
The domino theory 
It has long been argued that Indonesia will never allow 
~ast Timor to go independent for fear of the repercussions 
m other parts of the country like West Papua and Aceh. 
~ut it now appears that the present ABRI leadership be-
lieves that by disentangling itself from East Timor it will 
be in a better possible to devote its hard-pressed re~ources 
to coping with these other problems. People no longer ac-
cept ABRI's dominant role in society, nor are the authori-
ties able to cope with the many social eruptions. The dis-
turbances in Aceh, Ambon and parts of Java have exposed 
ABRI's weaknesses. The demand for wide-ranging auton-
omy or federalism is growing in many of the country's far-
flung regions. 
It may have been the domino theory that persuaded 
Megawati Sukamoputri, chair of the PDI-Perjuangan, to 
come out forcefully against allowing East Timor to go in-
dependent. She argued that the present government is a 
transitional ~overnment and has no authority to take such a 
decision. She has also refuted Habibie's ·view that East 
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Timor is a ' burden ', a 'drain on the nation's resources'. 
Speaking to a huge rally of the party faithful on 14 Febru-
ary, she declared that the decision to integrate East Timor 
into the Republic was irreversible. Since she is a front run-
ner to become Indonesia's next president, her position is a 
setback for East Timor. 
The other key opposition leaders, notably Abdurrach-
man Wahid who leads the Nahdlatul Ulama and Amien 
Rais whose party enjoys the backing of the Muhammadi-
yah and who are both likely to win significant support in 
the Indonesian elections in June, have come out in support 
of a referendum in East Timor. 
Public support for independence grows 
For several years East Timorese resistance leaders have 
insisted that independence was just a matter of time. Jose 
Ramos-Horta even said that it would happen before the 
millennium. What was once seen as wild optimism now 
seems to be true. 
Following the downfall of Suharto, the student move-
ment in Timor took advantage of the power vacuum in Ja-
karta and ABRl's setbacks to organise mass rallies in the 
cities and the countryside. The main demands of their 
meetings and rallies were a referendum and the sacking of 
Governor Abilio Osorio Soares, a close political and busi-
ness associate of the Suharto clique. 
It quickly became clear that the vast majority of 
Timorese were preparing themselves for an independent 
East Timor and that ABRI was fighting a losing battle. 
Even though fresh troops have been brought in, morale is 
at rock-bottom. It is now estimated that the number of 
troops in East Timor is approaching 21,000. East Timor 
used to be the place for young officers to gain quick pro-
motion and fat bonuses but those days are gone. The occu-
pying army has been unable to stem the tide of mass mobi-
lisation. 
Another change has been the formation of Timorese 
political parties, though they are officially still banned. The 
five pre-1975 Timorese political parties have been re-
established while the two main parties, Fretilin and UDT 
have opened offices in Dili, as has the CNRT, the Council 
of Timorese Resistance, the umbrella for pro-independence 
groups. There are other political structures as well: 
GRPRTT, a loose coalition of prominent Timorese who 
used to work within the Indonesian administration, is one. 
The most striking of all is the student federation Dewan 
Solidaritas Mahasiswa Pemuda dan Pe/ajar Timar Timur 
which has became the rallying point for the majority of the 
students and has succeeded in bringing out tens of thou-
sands of people on the streets. 
Others are Forsarepetil, the organisation of pro-
referendum Timorese academics and government employ-
ees, the youth organisation Ojetil, the women's organisa-
tion OMT, and several radical political parties, PST, APKT 
and PRO. 
Changes also seem to be afoot on the military front. 
Late last year, Colonel Tono Suratman the present military 
commander of East Timor told the visiting Canadian am-
bassador that he was ready to start negotiations with Fa/in-
ti/, the armed wing of the resistance. And he actually called 
it by its proper name, not the 'GPK' the acronym which 
stands for 'wild disruptor gangs'. 
The para-military threat 
While most of the talk in Jakarta is about autonomy and 
independence, the military situation in East Timor presents 
a very different picture. People in Jakarta like Alatas who 
oppose a referendum argue that this would inevitably lead 
to civil war. What is happening on the ground in many 
parts Timor suggests that well-armed gangs are determined 
to make this prophesy a reality. 
New militia recruits 
The policy change in Jakarta threw the pro-integrasi 
groups in Timor into a panic. They felt betrayed by the 
government in Jakarta. There have always been Timorese 
who side with the occupiers. The early pro-integrasi 
groups within the UDT and Apodeti were driven into the 
Indonesian embrace because of their conflict with Fretilin. 
Over the years the parties have splintered, with some 
members shocked by the brutalities of the colonising 
power. Today, most have joined the pro-referendum forces. 
T~~ latest pro-in~egrasi groups consist mainly of para-
m~l~tary umts, which are armed and co-ordinated by local 
m1htary commands. Their leaders are people who have 
collaborated with military intelligence run by the notorious 
Kopassus commandos or have served in the Indonesian 
civil administration. 
Indonesian army documents that were leaked abroad 
[s~~ TAPG_L Bulletin No 149/150] reveal that 12 para-
m1htary umts are under the Dili military command, Korem 
164. They are locally based and come under the direction 
of the sub-district military commands. 
The twelve teams listed in the documents are: 
NAME Subdistrict Total 
Team Saka Baucau 304 
Team Alfa Lospalos 115 
Team Makikit Viqueque 168 
Team Halilintar Atabae 121 
Team Railakan Erm era 136 
Team Ainaro Ainaro 92 
Team Suai Suai 22 
Team Same Same 102 
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Team Sakunar Aileu 31 
Team Morok Manatuto 34 
Team Liquisa Liquisa 9 
TOTAL 1134 
[see also TAPOL Occasional Reports No. 26, EAST 
TIMOR, An Analysis of Indonesian Army Documents, 
October 1998]. 
But there are other more informal para-military units 
which are not listed in the Korem 164 documents, notably 
the Dili-based Gadapaksi, and the Ainaro-based Mahidin, 
as well as others which are apparently nameless. These 
informal groups are particularly vicious and militaristic, as 
their names suggest. Mahidin stands for Mati atau Hidup 
Integrasi dengan Indonesia which means 'Life or Death 
for Integration with Indonesia' while Gadapaksi stands for 
Garda Penegak lntegrasi or 'Guards to Uphold Integra-
tion' . Gadapaksi was set up several years ago to strike out 
against the clandestine movement in Dili. Its godfather was 
Lt. General Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, one of the 
most notorious Kopassus officers. He is now living in exile 
in Jordan but his network in East Timor still exists, is ap-
parently well funded and enjoys the support of people like 
Governor Abilio Osorio Soares. 
Beachhead against guerrillas 
The para-military units under Korem 164 function as a 
buffer between the Fa/inti! guerrillas and the ABRI territo-
rial units. ABRI gives them weapons and uses them on the 
front line in remote hamlets which are close to guerrilla 
strongholds. The army's strategy of 'letting Timorese fight 
Timorese' goes back a long time but some analysts believe 
that using East Timorese as the beachhead against the guer-
rillas is a sign of defeat and of the low morale of Indone-
sian soldiers. According to the military documents, the men 
killed in combat in Baucau, Viqueque, Atabae and Liquisa 
were para-militaries. 
In the past two months, ABRI has stepped up its re-
cruitment drive for the army and for civilian guards called 
Wanra (Perlawanan Rakyat) or People's Resistance and 
has been busy recruiting West Timorese into the army. In 
February, ABRI said that a thousand new Wanra recruits 
had been enlisted. Described as being part of a nation-wide 
programme to provide extra security, they will be spread 
out across the 13 districts of Timor and are already under-
going military training. They will be inaugurated on 1 May 
and receive a monthly allowance ofRp 250,000. 
Some of the more notorious para-military leaders such 
as Basilio Araujo of Gadapaksi, Edmundo da Silva of Alfa, 
Lafaek of Makikit, Cancio Carvalho of Mahidin and Joao 
Tavares of Halilintar are frequently quoted in the press. 
Their language is very belligerent and is always laced with 
threats of a civil war. 
Arming the para-military 
The para-military threat is not new to East Timor. Be-
fore they emerged, there were the ninjas or hooded killers, 
who roamed the towns terrorising the people. 
Using Timorese to fight Timorese was the idea behind 
the formation of two special battalions, 744 and 745 con-
sisting only of Timorese soldiers under Indonesian offi-
cers. But many members defected to the jungle with their 
weapons or showed a reluctance to fight the guerrillas. As 
a result, Timorese now account for less than half the men 
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in the two battalions. This is the context in which the occu-
pation forces have now placed their hopes in a new and 
highly belligerent force. 
While it is know that the para-militaries are recruited 
either by the military commands or by trustworthy 
Timorese collaborators, on the crucial question of how they 
obtain their weapons, the situation is less straightforward. 
Senior officers have contradicted each other. One ABRI 
spokesperson in Jakarta told the BBC that weapons were 
given to them 'on loan ' and returned after the 'job' has 
been accomplished, but other generals have denied that 
they are being armed by ABRI. The para-military leaders 
openly boast about getting their weapons from the local 
commands ... and keeping them. 
As for the Wanra units, the Wiranto version is that their 
task is to assist the regular troops in upholding law and 
order. As an example, he mentioned Alas [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 149/150] where 13 people were held hostage 
by the guerrillas, five soldiers were killed and their weap-
ons captured. But human rights activists in Dili say that it 
is beyond doubt that the military and para-military were the 
ones who caused a bloodbath in the area. 
Bishop Belo and Manuel Carrascalao who heads the 
GRPRTT have strongly criticised the arming of the militias 
and reject the claim that this is to counter operations by the 
guerrillas. Following a vicious attack on the village of 
Galita in January when at least four civilians were shot 
dead by members of Mahidin and thousands of people fled 
the area to take refuge at a church in Suai, Bishop Belo 
said: "In the fifteen years I have been here, I've never 
heard of Fretilin raiding a village and causing 6,000 to flee. 
Yet, the moment the Wanra are formed, 6,000 people were 
forced to flee.' 
It is not easy to assess the number of weapons in circu-
lation among the para-militaries. Members of Mahidin 
have bragged about 10,000 firearms being handed out 
across the country but according to Clementina dos Reis 
Amaral of Komnas Ham, the National Human Rights 
Commission, and Manuel Carrascalao, it is much less than 
this. From past experience, ABRI might think hard before 
handing out so many weapons, fearing that they could end 
up in the hands of the guerrillas. Ten thousand is probably 
far too high, but there are no doubt enough in circulation to 
make the situation in East Timor highly explosive. 
If Jakarta is really serious about its new policy, Habibie 
and Wiranto will have respond to demands for the disarm-
ing and disbandment of the para-militaries. This is the lit-
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mus test for Jakarta' s switch of policy. The international 
community must also assert its authority by sending inde-
pendent monitors to East Timor to oversee the dismantling 
of this dangerous force and safeguard the lives of the peo-
ple of East Timor. 
Xanana's role in a volatile situation 
Most Timorese believe that independence is just a mat-
ter of time. But they have seen so many developments on 
the international arena - the outrage after the Santa Cruz 
massacre, the Nobel Peace Prizes for Bishop Belo and Ra-
mos-Horta, visits from many UN officials - yet things in-
side East Timor have not changed. In such circumstances, 
they can be forgiven for losing patience. This was the mes-
sage conveyed in Xanana Gusmao's lengthy New Year's 
message - a plea for more patience and for people to keep 
faith in the face of slow but steady developments. 
Quite remarkably, in the weeks following the policy 
shift in Jakarta, there were no mass rallies in Dili even 
though many atrocities were being committed by the paras 
in several parts of the country. This was in response to 
fears by the resistance leaders that rallies could be used by 
Kostrad paratroopers on 7 December 1975 prior to being 
airlifted into East Timor. The photo is from an article in Air 
Force Magazine, January 1999. The article: 'Drop Zone 
Dili' by Hendro Subroto gives a detailed account of the In-
donesian invasion of East Timor. 
provocateurs to create chaos. On 16 February however, 
I 50,000 people went out onto the streets to mourn peace-
fully for the death of Benedito de Jesus Pires who was 
killed by the authorities two days earlier. The march 
through the capital was carefully supervised by hundreds 
of stewards from the student movement. 
Far away in Jakarta, Xanana now works day and night 
to bring together all the rival groups. Before he left Cipi-
nang Prison, he had an important meeting with NU leader, 
Gus Dur who asked for - and received - the assurance that 
Xanana would do all in his power to safeguard the security 
of the vast number of Indonesian migrants now living and 
working in East Timor. Gus Dur was the first top-level 
opposition leader to visit Xanana; others could soon fol-
low. 
Within days of his release into 'house arrest', he had 
met many East Timorese of various political persuasions 
including representatives of the CNRT office in Dili, the 
present governor Abilio Osario Soares, and the former 
president's special ambassador for East Timor affairs, 
Lopez da Cruz. Just before he left Cipinang Prison, he met 
the former governor, Mario Carrascalao and they agreed to 
set up a Commission of Reconciliation, headed by Mario. 
There is talk of this Commission convening its first meet-
ing in Jakarta, which would be attended by Xanana. 
On 4 March, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
will visit Jakarta and is bound to meet Xanana. On 10 
March, the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers 
will meet again in New York to thrash out a mutually-
acceptable way of consulting the East Timorese on auton-
omy or independence. As the speed of developments gath-
ers pace, there are real hopes that the 23-year long struggle 
of the courageous people of East Timor is nearing its frui-
tion. 
UK and others pledge peace-keepers 
The British Government will send troops and financial 
assistance for a UN peace-keeping force in Timor after 
Indonesia's withdrawal. The decision was conveyed to 
Xanana Gusmao in a letter from Minister of State Derek 
Fatchett. Similar pledges have been made by Nordic coun-
tries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. 
Welcoming the British pledge, Jose Ramos-Horta 
praised Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and International 
Development Secretary Clare Short who were 'sensitive 
towards East Timor and very aware that they have to make 
up for Britain's arms sales to Indonesia'. [The Independent, 
20 February] In addition to the countries mentioned here, 
the Irish Government has also pledged support. 
A senior official of the International Red Cross who 
visited Timor said the agency would try to calm the situa-
tion down and be ready to act fast in the case of a humani-
tarian disaster because of the fear and anxiety in the terri-
tory. The agency is seeking permission from the armed 
forces commander to enlarge its mission in Timor. [AFP, 
19 February] 
Attention should also be given to various UN agencies 
sending teams to Timor to help alleviate problems by re-
placing Indonesian personnel such as doctors. A UN offi-
cial is shortly to take up a special post in Jakarta, with un-
limited access to Timor. * 
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Women's conference breaks new ground 
A conference on 'Timorese Women and International Law' convened by the International Platform 
of Jurists for East Timor, IP JET, was held in Lisbon in January. It provided a forum for the discus-
sion of a variety of issues confronting Timorese women caused by the horrors of the Indonesian in-
vasion as well as by discrimination against women within East Timorese society. The presence of 
women coming direct from East Timor greatly enriched the discussions. 
The conference brought together East Timorese women 
in the diaspora active with the resistance, outstanding hu-
man rights activists working for years in solidarity with 
East Timor, two East Timorese women who came from 
Dili and an East Timorese student in Y ogyakarta, along 
with lawyers and academics from Indonesia, Portugal and 
elsewhere. With such a mixed composition, there were 
lively discussions on a number of controversial issues, as 
well as a sense of frustration at the inability of international 
legal instruments to deal effectively with the crimes against 
humanity experienced on a daily basis by Timorese women 
during the 23 years their country has been under Indone-
sian occupation. 
Intolerable sufferings exposed 
The most memorable moments occurred during the ses-
sion addressed by two Timorese women, themselves the 
victims of Indonesian atrocities. Fatima Guterres spent 
several years in the bush as the secretary of Falintil, the 
armed resistance. She became the commander of the 
women's brigade and described the horrors inflicted on the 
population by the encirclement and annihilation campaign 
launched in 1977 by the Indonesian army with the support 
of US aircraft when tens of thousands of Timorese were 
forced to flee, many carrying ill and dying children. After 
her husband died in her arms, she was captured gravely 
weakened and hungry. Thereafter, she was tortured and 
raped under interrogation. Later, when she was being 
transported by helicopter, she saw another woman being 
raped and thrown out of the aircraft. 
Fatima said that these painful memories had strength-
ened her resolve to resist the Indonesian invaders. After 
living for several in Dili, she left the country and now lives 
in Portugal. 
The other speaker was Armandina Gusmao Santos, 
the sister of Xanana Gusmao, who lives in Dili. She spoke 
of the horrors of the day of the invasion on 7 December 
1975 when Indonesian soldiers parachuted into Dili and 
scores of men and women were shot dead at the wharf. 
Unable to control her emotions as she spoke, she described 
the constant humiliations which women in occupied East 
Timor experience at the hands of the Indonesian soldiers. 
The session was chaired by Jim Dunn, former Austra-
lian diplomat who has written extensively on East Timor. 
He was the first person to conduct interviews with 
Timorese refugees in Portugal about the appalling atroci-
ties perpetrated in Dili on the day of the invasion. In re-
sponse to the appalling experiences of the two speakers, he 
strongly condemned the international community for its 
failure to support East Timor in the early years of the oc-
cupation and for its continuing failure to force Indonesia's 
rulers and members of the security forces to be held re-
sponsibility under international law for their crimes against 
the people of East Tim or. He spoke of the need for a major 
international tribunal on crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in East Timor. 
Organising in defence of women's rights 
The other woman from Dili to address the conference 
was Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves, popularly known 
as Micato. She now heads a women's rights organisation in 
Dili, Forkopas, the Communications Forum for the 
Women ofLoro Sae. 
She was only fifteen at the time of the invasion. She 
saw her father being arrested and later went into the hills to 
join up with the resistance, where she concentrated her ef-
forts on working in the women's organisation, the OPMT, 
but was captured in 1978. After a month of intense interro-
gation, she was released. In 1981, after her husband was 
arrested, she began to get interested in women's issues and 
became an avid reader of women's literature. 
Forkopas has a wide range of activities including sup-
porting women political prisoners and the families of po-
litical prisoners, running seminars and courses to empower 
women, providing support to mothers after child-birth and 
in the care of their children,and counselling women who 
have been traumatised by experiences with the forces of 
occupation or because of discrimination within Timorese 
society. It also provides courses on women's rights and 
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promotes the principles contained in the UN 's Convention 
for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, CEDA W. She spoke of the cultural genocide un-
derway in Timor but said that despite the occupiers efforts 
to win the hearts and minds of the Timorese youth through 
the education system, they had not succeeded in isolating 
them from the resistance. 
The organisation issues a Bulletin called Babadok; it is 
named after the cylinder-shaped drum which is played only 
by women. 
Micato later told TAPOL that her organisation was set 
up two years ago and has a staff of fifteen with four de-
partments, for the dissemination of information, for educa-
tion, for the support of victims and the running of crisis 
centres and for advocacy regarding gender issues and 
women's rights in a deeply patriarchal society. 
Discrimination against women 
Another major contribution came from Ivete de Ol-
iveira, a student in Y ogyakarta who spoke at length about 
her research into the position of women in marriage, their 
subordinate status within their husband's family and the 
competing position of women whose husbands take several 
wives. The dowry system frequently resulted in wives be-
ing treated as little more than chattels, she said. 
She also spoke of widespread domestic violence. Out of 
200 respondents in a recent study conducted in East Timor, 
eighty per cent of the women said they had experienced 
beating or other forms of violence. Women were reluctant 
to report their sufferings to their own families, to the 
church or to the police and had been brought up to consider 
these sufferings as 'fate' . In many parts of the country, 
only the boys were sent to school, while women were fre-
quently disregarded when problems of the community were 
being discussed. Women who had been defiled and raped 
or forced into marriage by Indonesian soldiers were often 
ostracised by their own families. All too frequently, it was 
the vietim who was blamed for what had happened to her. 
She reported the case of a widowed Timorese woman 
who had been forced into liaisons with three Indonesian 
soldiers from whom she had borne three children. She had 
received no sympathy from the church in her predicament 
and when she died of cancer in 1997, the church refused 
her the last rites. 
As part of her degree in Yogyakarta, Ivette has written a 
dissertation on the Timorese women's organisation, OPMT 
which was set up by Fretilin in 1975. In the course of her 
investigations, she discovered that the most highly revered 
OPMT leader was known by her nom de guerre as Mu/her 
de Tapo. She fought for several years with Falintil and 
who, ivette said, ;as the first wo~an to die in the line of 
fire. The OPMT's first leader, Rosa Bonaparte, was shot 
dead in Dili by the invading troops, along with scores of 
others. 
Another speaker, George Aditjondro, an Indonesian 
academic now lecturing in Australia said that it was re-
grettable that too little attention was being paid to the his-
tory of the OPMT. 
Women and the resistance 
The most controversial issue during the conference was 
the role of women in the East Timorese resistance move-
ment. Timorese women living in exile in Portugal, Austra-
lia, Canada and the UK were highly critical of the poor 
representation of women in the governing councils of the 
resistance organisation, the CNRT, and of the difficulties 
they had had in getting their views expressed in what was a 
male-dominated organisation. 
The chairperson of Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri, strongly re-
jected claims that there was an anti-woman bias in his party 
or in the CNRT, while the women who had come from 
East Timor seemed to feel uncomfortable with the feminist 
overtones of the challenges being presented. The experi-
ences of Timorese women in the diaspora have clearly in-
jected a new dimension in the discussion of women's is-
sues in East Timor. 
This vigorous discussion and the information imparted 
about the depth of discrimination within Timorese society 
means that women's issues will certainly be one of the 
major questions to be confronted by East Timorese society 
once it has liberated itself from the shackles of the Indone-
sian occupation. The conference in Lisbon could prove to 
be a landmark in preparing both men and women for this 
mammoth task. * 
continued from page 10 
bon, there were no fewer that four provocations. Two in-
volved minibus passengers being beating up by the driver and 
the other two involved office workers being attacked with 
machetes by unidentified persons. It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that this was a show of force, to scare off the ob-
servers, making it impossible for them to continue with their 
mission. 
Horizontal and vertical conflicts 
In today's complex political climate in Indonesia, both 
horizontal and vertical conflicts have emerged. This is to be 
expected after a Jong period of an authoritarian dictatorship. 
The political conflict in Aceh, reported elsewhere in this issue, 
is primarily vertical. Acehnese society is relatively homoge-
nous and is held together by a deep sense of dissatisfaction 
with Jakarta, which varies in strength among different sections 
of society but the object of people's discontent is the same. 
Under such circumstances, it is difficult for military intelli-
gence or provocateurs to destabilise Acehnese community. 
The only way to create terror is by sending in professional 
killers. 
The situation in Maluku is more vulnerable and fragile. 
The community in places like Ambon is very heterogeneous 
and provocateurs can reap a grim harvest. This kind of hori-
zontal conflict is very damaging and will have a negative im-
pact on efforts to build a healthy civil society there for many 
years to come. 
Placed in the context of the evil intentions emanating from 
the Suharto clique to destabilise the situation in Indonesia, the 
prospects for Indonesia in the coming difficult months as the 
June elections approach are not good. * 
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Huge death toll in Maluku riots 
In January, serious riots flared up in Maluku, a group of islands stretching from the Philippines in 
the north to Australia in the south. This is the worst outbreak of violence since the fall of Suharto 
last May. It has coused social upheaval and hundreds of casualties with 50,000 people seeking ref-
uge in mosques, churches and police barracks. Clashes are still continuing, with no end in sight. 
Most of the conflict occurred in central Maluku, on one 
of the main islands, the densely populated Ambon, but also 
on the smaller islands of Haruku and Sanana. The other 
main island Seram was also affected. The wave of violence 
started on 15 January on the island of Dobo in south-east 
Maluku where eight people were killed in riots. 
bourhood of Ambon, and a passenger from Batumerah, a 
Muslim district. The conflict quickly turned into a full-
scale communal conflict; within hours, the city was in 
flames. 
This first wave of rioting lasted for six days and the city 
took on the appearance of a battle-ground. People evacu-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ed from their homes and entire ne~h­
Tens of thousands people had to flee from their houses 
The main clashes occurred in Ambon city, the capital of 
Ambon. They started on 19 January, coinciding with Idul 
Fitri, the festival that ends the Muslim fasting month. 
Maluku has until now been regarded as a region of ex-
emplary ethnic and religious harmony. Just a few weeks 
earlier, President Habibie had pointed to Maluku as a 
shining example of harmony. The Maluku archipelago 
consists of 1,027 islands with a population of 2.08 million. 
The majority, according to 1997 figures, are Muslims 
(59.01 per cent) with Protestants accounting for 35.29 per 
cent and Catholics for 5.19 per cent. 
There has been an influx of people from other parts of 
Indonesia, adding to the ethnic diversity, especially people 
from the island of Buton and many Buginese traders, 
mostly of the Muslim faith. The civil administration con-
sists of people from all parts of Indonesia. 
War-like situation in Ambon 
The initial clash in Ambon started with a quarrel be-
tween a minibus driver from Mardika, a Christian neigh-
bourhoods went up in smoke. At least one 
hundred people were killed in Jess than a 
week while hundreds more were severely 
injured. Some three hundred people are 
- reported missing. 
A local observer estimated that at least 
three thousand houses were gutted, while 
31 churches and mosques, 5 markets, 4 
shopping centres and more than 1,000 
shops and kiosks were destroyed. A num-
ber of government buildings, hotels, 
schools and one cinema also went up in 
flames. Some 130 cars, 100 motor cycles 
and 430 pedicabs were destroyed. 
At least 50,000 people took refuge in 
public buildings, churches, mosques and 
police or military barracks. The main Prot-
estant church Maranatha and the main 
mosque Al Fatah were inundated with 
thousands of terrified families who had 
lost all their belongings. An initial estimate 
of the material damage is 500 billion 
rupiah (US$ 55 million) 
For several days the airport of Ambon was closed. For-
eigners ./were evacuated by military planes to Darwin, 
Australfa and Ujung Pandang in Sulawesi. The Governor 
of Maluku, Saleh Latuconsina,announced a curfew and the 
militaty issued a shoot-on-sight order for anyone resisting 
the authorities. Troops were brought in from many parts of 
Indonesia, including police units from East Timar. ABRI 
commander-in-chief General Wiranto flew to Ambon to 
monitor the situation. 
Social disintegration 
Observers warn that similar unrest could happen any-
where in Indonesia. The source of the trouble is a highly 
combustible mix of severe economic problems affecting 
people everywhere, in the wake of the collapse of a 32-year 
totalitarian regime, which quelled all fundamental free-
doms. Normal political life was prohibited and civil society 
was utterly destroyed. As a result, democratic traditions 
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were eroded, to be replaced by authoritarian patron-client 
relations. 
According to Professor Loekman Soetrisno of the 
Gadjah Mada University, the key to the country's social 
problems is chronic poverty and a concentration of hard-
line religious sentiment. Unrest often springs from long-
held animosities between rival religious and ethnic groups. 
This, he said, could lead to clashes erupting almost without 
warning. Loekman listed a number of places in the archi-
pelago which he described as potential flash points. 
Wiranto and the opposition 
On the fourth day of the riots, General Wiranto arrived 
in Ambon together with a party of generals but it soon be-
came obvious that the security forces were unable to con-
trol the situation and Wiranto flew back to Jakarta without 
achieving anything, not even meeting the different local 
religious leaders. All the four-star general could do was 
hand over Rp500 million to the local government for relief. 
In desperation, General Wiranto held an emergency meet-
ing with the Ciganjur Four. 
The Ciganjur Four, named after the place where Gus 
Dur, a Muslim leader, lives, consists of the four top politi-
cal leaders outside the system. Amien Rais, Megawati and 
Abdurrachman Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is known, repre-
sent the main political opposition groups, while the Sultan 
of Y ogyakarta is revered by many people in Central Java. 
Wiranto's meeting with the four opposition leaders 
conveys a number of political messages. It was highly sig-
nificant that the commander-in-chief felt the need to confer 
with the opposition about the grave situation in Ambon, 
revealing the weakness of the Habibie government and the 
inability of ABRI to restore peace and order in Ambon. It 
was patently obvious that appeals for calm from Habibie 
had gone totally unheeded in Maluku. 
The two key post-Suharto players, President Habibie 
and ABRI chief General Wiranto, are still widely seen as 
Suharto stalwarts, greatly affecting their legitimacy and 
credibility. Wiranto's high-profile approach to leading non-
military leaders was also an effort to cast aside his image as 
a Suharto protege. It has to be said however that the meet-
ing with the Cigajur Four had little effect on events in 
Maluku. 
New waves of violence 
After the first wave of riots, the situation in Ambon re-
mained volatile while violent events outside the capital 
kept the situation on the boil in several islands. A few 
thousand Buginese left Ambon by ship and it is unclear 
whether they will return to Ambon. 
On 20 January a nasty incident occurred in the tiny vil-
lage of Telagakodok and the nearby Benteng Karan~ ham-
let 30 km north of Ambon city. These two predommantly 
Christian centres of population were wiped out. The ~t­
tackers killed twelve people and left seven injured, while 
more than one thousand inhabitants fled their homes. Most 
are migrants from south-east Maluku and the island of 
Flores. 
Then in February more violence erupted in Kairatu, a 
small village on Seram, the island which is .seen by many 
locals as the main island. According to official reports, ten 
people died. 
On 14 February, another violent clash occurred, t~is 
time on the island of Haruku which is very close to the is-
land of Ambon. There was a serious clash between the two 
communities Muslim and Christian, which resulted in 
thirteen deaths and forty-three seriously injured. According 
to press reports, most of the victims died from guns~ot 
wounds which may be because the army and the pohce 
were operating their shoot-on-sight command. The trigger 
for this violence was the torching a day earlier of the house 
of a Christian family. 
Provocateurs 
Analysts are puzzled as to why a relatively harmonious 
society could explode so violently. 135 people have been 
arrested in Ambon alone and are undergoing intensive 
questioning. At least half are likely to go on trial. Many 
were identified as members of the notorious organisation 
Pemuda Pancasila (PP), which can best be described as the 
biggest group of 'organised crime', and which enjoys the 
political protection of the Suharto family. After Suharto's 
downfall, this group has repeatedly been mentioned as the 
main provider of provocateurs in the many cases of looting 
and riots. The PP is chaired by a notorious individual, Yor-
rys Raweyaj, a frequent visitor to the Suharto residence, 
who has won himself a place in Indonesia's rogues' gal-
lery, symbolising the bleak political climate in post-
Suharto Indonesia. Many analysts believe that Cendana 
(the Suharto residence) finances the disruptive operations 
of Y orrys and his hirelings but nobody has yet come up 
with conclusive evidence. 
As for the Maluku riots, both General Wiranto and 
Maluku police chief Colonel Karyono have suggested that 
they were instigated by provocateurs. It is common knowl-
edge that provocateurs have played a key role in fanning 
riots in other places like Banyuwangi, Ketapang and 
Krawang. General Wiranto is said to have been informed 
about the role of PP provocateurs. 
According to reports in the Indonesian press, 862 pre-
man (political gangsters) arrived in Ambon shortly before 
the riots, which would suggest that provocation has played 
a major part in the on-going Maluku tragedy. The activities 
of the provocateurs appear to follow a pattern which has so 
far proven to be very effective. They create an incident 
which could be anything from beating up someone in the 
street to burning a house in a village. Information is then 
quickly disseminated to the affected community and 
hugely inflated on the way so as to have the greatest possi-
ble impact. 
During a visit to Ambon by two observers from Kom-
nas Ham, the National Human Rights Commission, to Am-
continued on page 8 
10 TAPOL Bulletin No. 151, March 1999 
ACEH 
Army shoots scores of people in Aceh 
Scores of people were shot dead in a massacre in Aceh on 3 February. This is Indonesia's worst 
massacre since the Santa Cruz Massacre of November 1991. Scores of people were killed, hundreds 
were injured and dozens of people are still unaccounted for. Initial investigations by local human 
rights activists in Aceh put the death toll at well above fifty. All those killed died of gunshot wounds. 
Like all massacres perpetrated in Indonesia in the past 
three and a half decades, the true death toll may never be 
accurately established as many dead bodies were spirited 
away by the army for secret disposal or dumped in rivers. 
The massacre occurred outside the local military com-
mand in the village of Idi Cut, East Aceh in the early hours 
of Wednesday 3 February 1999. Large crowds of people 
were returning home at a leisurely pace, some on foot, oth-
ers on motorcycles or pick-up trucks, from a gathering at 
the village of Matang Ulim. The event which was attended 
by five thousand people had proceeded peacefully and 
without incident. In addition to religious exhortations 
(dakwah), the rally heard speeches about the history of 
Aceh and about the Free Aceh Movement, known as Aceh 
Merdeka, a movement that the Indonesian army has been 
trying to quell since the mid 1970s. 
Attempts to halt meeting foiled 
Three hours before the meeting commenced, troops at-
tacked people who were constructing a stage and preparing 
the venue for the rally. They destroyed the stage, beating 
and injuring many people, including a three-year old boy, 
and told the organisers that the rally should be cancelled 
because no permit had been granted. However, thousands 
of people from surrounding villages were on their way al-
ready and the rally went ahead as planned. 
After the crowd dispersed in the early hours of 
Wednesday, hundreds of people were pelted with stones by 
youths as they neared Koramil, the military command in 
Idi Cut, in response to which some people described by 
witnesses as 'troublemakers' mingling with the crowd 
started throwing stones. As this was happening, three army 
trucks drove up and without warning, opened fired from 
their raised vantage point, killing and wounding a large 
number of people. According to witnesses, gunfire contin-
ued to be heard for several hours, while blood was flowing 
everywhere. Some of the survivors were driven off to a 
nearby police station in Langsa. Later that morning, as 
others who had taken refuge in nearby ditches emerged, 
they too were arrested. Of the fifty-three people arrested at 
the time, four men are still being held and may soon be 
charged. 
Soon after the massacre, the area where many people 
lay dead, dying or wounded was sealed off by the army. 
Local residents said that they saw army trucks being loaded 
with bodies. Later, the army forbade local residents from 
searching for bodies in nearby long grass or clearing the 
bush surrounding a nearby village. 
Soldiers in battle dress patrolling the streets 
The day after the massacre, it became known that some 
of the bodies had been taken to a bridge spanning the River 
Arakundo 30 kilometres away and thrown into the river. 
Within hours huge crowds converged on the spot to search 
for relatives or friends who had not returned home. Alto-
gether seven bodies were pulled out of the river. All the 
bodies had their hands and feet bound with wire and had 
sunk to the bottom because they had been weighed down 
with stones in sacks tied to the bodies. 
The fact that thousands of people turned up to attend a 
rally and listen to speeches about Free Aceh reveals the 
depth of popular feeling in Aceh and the revulsion against 
rule from Jakarta which has intensified since the downfall 
of the dictator Suharto last May. By using lethal force 
against an unarmed crowd returning home from a peaceful 
rally, the army was warning the Acehnese people to stop 
questioning their status · as part of the Republic of Indo-
nesia or face the consequences. 
Covering up an atrocity 
It is clear from the way the bodies were disposed of that 
the army has gone to great lengths to conceal the scale and 
the nature of the atrocity, to lie about the number of casu-
alties and to shift the blame for the deaths. The local mili-
tary command first said that only one person died, which it 
later increased to three. It alleged that people in the crowd 
had started firing first, a claim vigorously denied by many 
survivors and witnesses. 
A week later, the army claimed that Russian-made AK-
47 bullets which are not part of their arsenal had been used, 
trying to shift the blame onto members of Aceh Merdeka. 
However, local residents picked up standard army-duty 
bullet cartridges bearing the markings of the Indonesian 
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ammunitions company, Pindad, in the vicinity of the Idi 
Cut military command the day after the massacre. More 
Pindad bullets were recovered from wounded survivors and 
from the bodies found in the river. In defiance of every-
thing already known about the atrocity, the army also al-
leged that the shooting took place at the site of the rally as 
the crowds were dispersing. 
Army must withdraw, impunity must end 
In a statement issued on 15 February, TAPOL said that 
the human rights situation in Aceh will continue to deterio-
rate unless the army halts its special operations and with-
draws its troops from Aceh, not only the combat troops but 
also the territorial troops which make up the main force in 
the province. 
In the wake of this latest atrocity, there have been 
growing calls in Aceh for it to separate from the Republic 
of Indonesia by means of a referendum, bearing in mind 
that the Acehnese people have experienced one tragedy 
after another over the past ten years while members of the 
armed forces enjoy impunity from prosecution. Moreover, 
the Acehnese people have stood by powerless as the terri-
tory's rich natural resources have been exploited for the 
benefit of the heavily-centralised Indonesian state and 
those who control the country's economy, while receiving 
almost nothing in return. 
In response to the deepening sense of frustration in 
Aceh about its status and the overwhelming role of the 
military, the provincial governor, Professor Syamsuddi_n 
Mahmud recently suggested that the best way forward is 
for Aceh and other Indonesian provinces to become part of 
a federated state. This elicited a sharp rebuke from Indone-
sia's Minister of Justice, Professor Muladi, asserting that 
Indonesia is a unitary state. 
In its statement T APOL called on European Union em-
bassies in Jakarta to dispatch a team of diplomats to ~ceh 
to conduct investigations, consult local human nghts 
NGOs and report back to the EU Council of Ministers: It 
also called for an end to the army's current operation 
known as Operasi Wibawa '99, for all special forces to be 
withdrawn from Aceh as the first step towards the total 
demilitarisation of Aceh. 
Two men arrested for speaking at rally 
Two men who are suspected of having spoken at the 
mass rally held just before the Idi Cut massacre have been 
arrested. Dahlan alias Teungku Panton Labu, 32, was 
shot in the leg as he was being arrested. The injury was so 
serious that his leg had to be amputated. The police claim 
that he was shot because he attacked the police with a ma-
chete. A journalist from the local newspaper, Serambi was 
refused permission to speak to the wounded man. The 
other man arrested Raziman alias Teungku Bagok, 40, 
told journalists that he had handed himself in to the police 
because he felt threatened although he would not say from 
which quarter. He said that, as a villager, he spoke at the 
meeting because he felt moved by the Free Aceh issue. 
[Serambi, 18 February] *· 
Army brutality reigns supreme in Aceh 
When General Wiranto announced the lifting of Aceh 's military operational status last August, the 
Acehnese did not expect thorough investigations into the human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
military over the last ten years. Some may have hoped that their persecutors such as Suharto and 
Syarwan Hamid would be made accountable. Yet even those whose hopes were tempered by a knowl-
edge of the army's bloodthirsty ambitions in Aceh must be stunned by ABRl's latest barbarity. 
The recent excesses should be placed in the context of 
the army's determination not to relinquish control over 
Aceh that would result from ending daerah operasi militer 
or DOM. The intensification of military activity can be 
traced back to within five days of the announcement, when 
the media began to report renewed incidents of intimida-
tion. People who had revealed the location of mass graves 
in public were being harassed by unknown individuals. 
Government officials in Bireun were warned by a group of 
masked men not to talk to reporters or NGOs. A rape vic-
tim was intimidated by members of Kopassus for reporting 
what had happened to her. Two Kopassus officers at-
tempted to kidnap the wife of a man who had been ab-
ducted and has not been seen since. Mysterious Free Aceh 
flag-raising incidents began to occur, such as in Puloh Si-
ren village, Peudada subdistrict, North Aceh. 
Indeed the military's intentions were seriously tested in 
the announcement when Wiranto stated that 'although hu-
man rights violations took place, the soldiers were only 
doing their job of annihilating the armed security disturb-
ers,' adding that 'those who remain at large will sooner or 
later receive their just desserts from God.' On the same 
day, senior cabinet minister, retired General Feisal Tanjung 
told reporters that accusations of human rights abuses in 
Aceh were 'stories', whereas former 011/Lilawangsa Re-
gional Commander, Colonel Dasiri Muswar, speculated 
that the mass graves dated back to Dutch times or to the 
killing of communists in 1965. 
Kandang village 
Much of the harassment and intimidation in Aceh, as 
well as alleged Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh (GAM) activi-
ties, has focused on Kandang, close to the LNG-rich town 
of Lhokseumawe, where Mobil Oil Indonesia is based. In 
our last issue, we reported two alleged GAM incidents -
the first in November when an armed convoy flew Free 
Aceh flags, that ended at Kandang and the second involv-
ing a shoot-out between anti-riot police, Brimob, and GAM 
personnel, including Ahmad Kandang, said to be a GAM 
leader recently returned from Malaysia. In fact, some 
families living in Kandang had moved elsewhere, as a 
number of returnees from Malaysia previously unknown to 
them began to settle there, apparently carrying out their 
clandestine activities without hindrance from the security 
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forc~s. ~fore than a hundred people were arrested over the 
two mc1dents. To date it is estimated that at least 257 fami-
lies have yet to return to the village. 
During the fasting month, a woman had her prayer 
robe pulled off by a soldier as she was returning from 
Ramadhan prayers in a village near Kandang. The local 
villagers, angry with the military's continued harassment, 
marched to the local command post to demand an explana-
tion . Unsatisfied with the response, others joined from sur-
rounding villages and refused to disperse until military re-
inforcements eventually forced them to do so. But the 
crowd, frustrated by the military's attitude, attacked seven 
government offices in Bayu and Bukit Rata. They then 
moved on to Kandang, blocking the road between Medan 
and Lhokseumawe with electricity pylons lying nearby. 
The crowd started searching for military personnel. 
Army sponsored anarchy? 
News of clandestine killings of alleged informants, or 
cuak and the presence of 'ninjas' or professional killers 
coupled with a marked increase in military activity and a~ 
increasingly violent response from the Acehnese, turned 
Aceh into a province bordering on anarchy. Although it is 
unclear to what extent the role of the GAM is pivotal to the 
renewed unrest, the army has used alleged GAM activities 
to justify its increased use of violence. 
In December, three ninjas were found but escaped as 
part of the sweeping operations in Bayu and the dismem-
bered body of an alleged informant was found in Uteun 
Kot Cunda village. The following day, a 60-year-old man 
was attacked in his home in Keudee Krueng village, Kuta 
Makmur subdistrict and later a frustrated crowd in Sigli, 
Pidie province attacked the local Golkar office and burnt 
the motorbike of an alleged informant. Villagers spotted 
three ninjas in Blang Mangat subdistrict; they gave chase 
but the men escaped. Later, people in Meurah Muliah sub-
district apprehended a ninja who was caught trying to 
break into the Luang Angen religious school. The man 
who would not reveal his name was carrying sharp weap-
ons. The crowd took him to the local police station where 
he was interrogated briefly, but was later spirited away by 
angry crowd, according to the police. Later in December, 
there were more ninja sightings in Mane Kareung village, 
Blang Mangat subdistrct, in an incident where an 18-year 
old man was followed on his moped and eventually pushed 
off by two •mknown individuals. On the same day, a crowd 
burnt down a bank in Beureunuen, 12 Km east of Sigli, and 
the following day an armed informer was found dead in the 
village of Matang Sijuek Barat, North Aceh. Local people 
said the man used to be GAM, but became a double agent. 
Lhok Nibong 
The renewed violence in Aceh climaxed with the kid-
napping and killing of eight soldiers on the road around 
Lhok Nibong, Simpang Ulim subdistrict, East Aceh, cou-
pled with the military's equally violent response. Local 
people were said to be carrying out 'sweeping' operations 
and identity card searches because of the ninjas, when they 
stopped a bus carrying sixteen soldiers from the local in-
fantry brigade on their way to Medan. Later, Marine Major 
Edyanto Chairuddin and two of his men were kidnapped 
near Padang Sakti village, East Aceh. The army's response 
was unequivocal. In sharp contrast to its 'commitment' to 
resolving the thousands of cases of human rights abuses 
committed against civilians in Aceh, the military pulled out 
all the stops in the search for its personnel. This included 
drafting in hundreds of reinforcements from Medan and 
Jakarta, including airborne troops and Brimob and Gegana 
elite police forces. Twenty-five civilians were arrested for 
the kidnappings and accused of being members of GAM. 
Operasi Assert Authority '99 
In retaliation, the army launched Operasi Wibawa 99 or 
'Assert Authority' operation, a joint police-military opera-
tion, headed by the police with two main aims - to appre-
hend Ahmad Kandang and his followers, and to find the 
missing men. In January, three of the kidnapped soldiers' 
bodies were found in the Arakundo River, East Aceh. The 
bloodthirsty impact of Operation Assert Authority was 
immediate. 
• thok Sukon 
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On 3 January, Lhokseumawe and the surrounding area 
was described as being like a war zone. In the early morn-
ing, security forces continued their search for Ahmad Kan-
dang and Major Edyanto, while villagers from Pusong 
marched into Lhokseumawe towards the North Aceh Re-
gent's office, about lkm away, to protest about central 
government indifference. The military soon began to fire 
indiscriminately on men, women and children on the 
streets of Lhokseumawe, also carrying out similar action in 
Kandang and Paloh, Muara Dua subdistrict, as well as 
Simpang Kramat and Buloh Blang Ara in Kuta Makmur 
subdistrict. Local estimates suggest that as many as forty 
people \Vere killed in and around Lhokseumawe on that 
day. More than 150 were arrested and dozens were treated 
in hospital. While some reports say 23 died, local people 
suggest that many bodies where whisked away by loved 
ones to avoid contact with the authorities and reprisals. 
The military has attempted to blame the deaths on 
GAM, accusing them of shooting. the Pusong villagers in 
the back, and using women as shields, but eye-witnesses 
from. Pusong vehe~ently deny this, stating categorically 
that 1t was the soldiers who shot fleeing civilians in the 
?ack. Many government buildings were destroyed by fire 
m Lhokseumawe, as well as several police stations and 
sub-district offices in nearby districts. 
The next day, military returned to Pusong, launching an 
ambush on the village mosque. Fifteen men were arrested 
accused of being followers of Ahmad Kandang. Four of the 
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detainees are expected to be charged with sedition. Al-
though the men offered no resistance, the excessive force 
used by the military to attack the mosque angered local 
people, who attempted to break into the compound of the 
011/Li lawangsa regional military post as well as the re-
gent's office. The security forces fired into the crowd. One 
victim, Zailani, from Nisam subdistrict, was taken to Cut 
Meutia hospital, but died of gunshot wounds. 
Operasi Wibawa in action 
Army kill five detainees 
On 6 January the National Commission for Human 
Rights, Komnas HAM, arrived in Aceh, partly under pres-
sure from the military to investigate abuses against their 
members. Although the team met some victims of military 
abuses and travelled to Pusong village and elsewhere, they 
were told it would be too dangerous for them to visit Kan-
dang. In fact, the day before, the military had sealed off all 
roads to and from Kandang. Everyone was rounded up to 
be questioned about their involvement with GAM and no 
one was allowed to leave. 
The day after the Commission members returned to Ja-
karta, the military carried out more attacks on the people of 
Aceh. At crack of dawn on 9 January, an Operasi Wibawa 
joint task-force headed by Police Lieutenant Colonel 
Iskandar Hasan ambushed Meunasah Blang Kandang vil-
lage, Muara Dua subdistrict, in search of the alleged sepa-
ratist leader, Ahmad Kandang. Within hours, the task-force 
had apprehended and detained forty people who were sus-
pected of being sympathisers of Ahmad Kandang. Seven 
were apprehended in Meunasah Blang Kandang and the 
others in Kuta Blang, when the task force intercepted a 
convoy of people headed towards Lhokseumawe. 
Most of the detainees were taken and held in a youth 
group's building, whilst two were taken away for treatment 
to Lhokseumawe General Hospital. They were Zulkifli 
Mahmud, 35, who was shot in the leg during the struggle at 
Kuta Blang, and Herman Husein, who later died of deep 
wounds to the head and body. Another man, Iwan Sukadi, 
was also taken to hospital with them, after he had been at-
tacked by separatist sympathisers. 
For much of the day, the 38 detainees were interrogated 
and during this process, some soldiers had to be restrained 
by other soldiers from beating their captives. Ten detain-
ees were taken away to the North Aceh police command 
for further investigation. 
Then all of a sudden, around 50 soldiers from a number 
of different units ambushed the building and began to beat 
and torture the detainees. As a result of the beatings and 
torture, five died in hospital and another 23 were hospital-
ised with serious injuries. 
Show trials 
On 30 January, Major Bayu Nadjib, the officer respon-
sible for the attack, was sentenced to six years' imprison-
ment and discharged from the army, after having been 
found guilty as charged - of assault. Medical evidence 
presented at the court martial of Major Bayu and five other 
soldiers proved without doubt that the five deaths were as a 
direct result of the injuries inflicted by them. It is incom-
prehensible that men responsible for such heinous and 
cynical crimes should not have been charged with murder. 
Although the military has said that it would try a total of 28 
soldiers, 'to set an example', eye-witnesses claim that over 
one hundred soldiers took part in the attack. On 27 Janu-
ary, another four soldiers were sentenced to seven years 
imprisonment, as well as being discharged. 
Ishak Daud given twenty years 
An Acehnese prisoner who went on trial for his activi-
ties as a member of GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, has 
been sentenced to twenty years. Sentence was passed on 4 
December. 
Ishak Daud was forcibly repatriated from Malaysia in 
March last year in violation of the UN Convention on 
Refugees. He was immediately arrested and went on trial 
last year. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 1491150, December 
1998] 
During the trial, he was moved to several different pris-
ons. The early sessions were held in Lhokseumawe district 
court but the authorities took the highly unusual step of 
shifting the trial to Sabang because the trial was drawing 
so much public interest that it was causing 'security prob-
lems' for the police. After sentence was passed, he was 
transferred to a high-security prison in Pematang Siantar, 
North Sumatra, and then again to a Class III prison in Sibo-
rong-borong, North Tapanuli also in North Sumatra. 
The authorities have justified these frequent movements 
on the grounds that Daud 'causes unrest' wherever he is 
held. * 
continued from page 15 
********** 
Following our conversation, we took photos of an old 
Dutch army cemetery in Peucut where 2,200 criminal sol-
diers are buried, including six generals. We studied the 
names engraved on the portals. Some were Ambonese, but 
most were Javanese. As he looked at the names, Nurdin 
said: 'The Acehnese never went to Java to kill anyone. But 
the Javanese came here to kill us. First, they came with the 
Dutch, and now they're here again on their own.' * 
From Wordt Vervolgd, Year 32, February 1999, the publica-
tion of the Dutch Section of Amnesty International. 
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'You'd better come along with us ... ' 
In 1990, the Indonesian armed forces arrested dozens of intellectuals suspected of supporting the 
Free 1ceh Movement. Among them was Drs Nurdin Abdul Rachman, lecturer in English language 
and literature at the Syah Kuala University in Banda Aceh. He was sentenced to nine years, in-
creased to 13 years on appeal. He was released last October. He is interviewed by Wiecher Hulst. 
'I studied at the University of Reading in the UK from 
January until April 1990. It took a lot of time and money to 
get my documents in Jakarta which made me feel I was 
being discriminated against because I was Acehnese. I 
publicly complained about this. I also spoke about the dis-
criminatory system of wages between the regions. 
'In 1990, several of my friends were arrested, including 
Mulkan Usman, for hoisting the Free Aceh flag. From that 
day on, he was under surveillance. He was eventually 
given a 15-year sentence. Apparently, the authorities linked 
me to him and I was arrested on 15 October 1990. Late at 
night, at 11 pm, I was picked up by army officers without 
an arrest warrant. They said, 'We want some information 
from you. You'd better come along with us ... ' 
'They took me to a military intelligence camp in Lam 
Pineung where I was tortured, day and night, for three 
months. I was accused of rebellion, of funding the Free 
Aceh guerrillas and of holding secret meetings. None of 
this was true, but whenever I denied anything, they tortured 
me. They attached electric wires to my teeth and ears and 
wound up a contraption like a phone, to produce electricity. 
The pain was unbearable. They also beat me without stop. 
In the end, I confessed to everything. It took the interroga-
tors one month to get all of us to say the same thing about 
a secret meeting that had allegedly been held in a textile 
factory called Kuta Alam Tailor. Afterwards, they arrested 
the factory director .. He knew nothing but got six years. He 
was eventually released in August 1996, before serving his 
full sentence. 
'After we had all confessed, we were taken to prison in 
Lhok Nga where we were tortured again, but not so badly 
as before. Here too the personnel were all military. At 
night, they would come to the prison drunk, throw stones at 
us and beat us with their rifle butts. They asked all kinds of 
stupid questions like, 'How many weapons did you bring 
from abroad?' and 'How many people have you killed?' 
'They cursed us and said: 'You are worse than pigs.' 
The military who tortured us in the military intelligence 
were Lieutenant Sumitro (known as Ucok), Second Lieu-
tenant Thamrin, Sergeant Untung, Sergeant Sastrowidoyo, 
Sergeant Wakiman and Sergeant Zul:fian (an Acehnese). 
Most of them were Javanese. They have all left Banda 
Aceh. We would very much like them to go on trial but 
there's not much chance of that happening at present, be-
cause people from the old regime still hold senior positions 
in the present government. 
'During my trial, I was closely guarded by soldiers so I 
didn't dare to retract my confession. I knew that if I had 
done so, I would have been tortured again. Five days be-
fore the trial, five prisoners were taken from Lhok Nga and 
heavily tortured for a whole day. We never saw them 
again. One was my cellmate Amiruddin, the others were 
Mahdi Yusuf, Adbullah, Hasan Ibrahim and Ahmad Idris. 
This is why we were so afraid and repeated the confessions 
in court. 
'The only one with the courage to tell the court he had 
been tortured was Adnan Beuranshah. This was because, 
on 12 July 1991, the International Red Cross came to 
Banda Aceh. After this, the torture stopped and we were 
able to receive visits from our families for this first time. 
We were very grateful to the International Red Cross. 
'On 22 October 1998 I was released but on two condi-
tions, that I would work hard and not laze around, and that 
I would only mix with good people. The question is, who 
do they mean? I am now teaching English freelance be-
cause I was not able to get my university job back. I also 
earn money selling agricultural products, to keep me and 
my family alive. 
'In prison, I wrote three books · in English. I hope one 
day to have them published. One deals with the history of 
the liberation of the Acehnese people and with injustices in 
the economy, in education and in culture; I'm afraid that 
Acehnese culture will disappear before long. I developed 
my views about Acehnese culture while in prison. Before 
my arrest, I was not an Acehnese nationalist, but I became 
one in prison.' 
continued on page 14 
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Major reshuffle in ABRI 
At the beginning of the New Year ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, underwent a major reshuffle 
when more than one hundred high-ranking officers were promoted or demoted A few months ear-
lier the Habibie government had suggested that no reshuffles should take place in ABRI until after 
the general elections, but the divisions within ABRI had become too intense to be left alone. 
It was General Wiranto who had the main say in the re-
shuffle. As commander-in-chief of ABRI and minister of 
defence, Wiranto used the reshuffle to place some of his 
most trusted officers in key positions. 
The big loser was Lt. General Prabowo (Suharto's son-
in-law) and his gang. Most of this group have been margi-
nalised. In August lat year Prabowo was discharged from 
the army because of his direct involvement in the kidnap 
and disappearance of dozens of human rights activists. 
ABRI is arguably facing the toughest test since its birth 
in 1945. Official figures from 1998 confirm the extent of 
the turmoil in Indonesia: there were 2,000 student demon-
strations, 1,300 rallies by NGOs and political groups, 500 
strikes and 50 riots. So far more than eighty police stations 
have been burned down by angry crowds. A 'shoot on 
sight' order has been issued by General Wiranto to quell 
the riots, a sign of desperation if ever there was one. 
With divisions within ABRI having flared up, the major 
aim of the reshuffle was to try to close ranks again. Un-
doubtedly one of the biggest strains on the force has been 
the new policy on East Timor and Wiranto's endorsement 
of it. 
The reformers 
The group of so-called reformers have gained in im-
portance. Army watchers see Lt-General Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono as the main reformer in ABRI. Previously 
Chief-of-Staff for Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol), 
his job was renamed Chief-of-Staff for Territorial Affairs. 
There was no such position formerly and in reality he still 
functions as Kassospol. The term sospol has become a 
curse for the reform movement as it reflects ABRI' s domi-
nant role in society, identified as its dual function or dwi-
fungsi. The Kassospol has always been one of the key po-
sitions in ABRI, as he represents ABRl's political face to 
the outside world. It is often argued that the Kassospol en-
joys a higher profile than the Army Chief-of-Staff. 
Lt-General Bambang Yudhoyono had the tough job of 
' selling' ABRI to the public at a time when ABRI's credi-
bility has sunk to its lowest point because of the many 
killings and kidnappings and because of its deep involve-
ment with the ousted and much reviled Suharto. As head of 
the ABRI fraction in Parliament, he fought hard to protect 
ABRI's 75 appointed ABRI seats. In the end, a compro-
mise was reached, giving ABRI 38 seats. Bambang came 
out of the conflict relatively unscathed; his social skills 
helped him project the image of the gentle face of ABRI. 
Other reformers are Lt-General Agus Widjojo who was 
promoted from Asrenum, Assistant for General Planning to 
become Commander of Sesko ABRJ, the Armed Forces 
Staff and Command School. Another reformer, Major 
General Agus Wirahadikusumah, formerly Chief of the 
Army Staff and Command School, took over the position 
of Asrenum. These three reformers are seen as the ones 
most willing to accept the new paradigm of ABRI gradu-
ally returning to barracks. 
The Kostrad gang 
Four-star General Wiranto has spent most of his army 
career in the Kostrad strategic reserve troops. Kostrad is 
the most prestigious outfit in ABRI and is equipped with 
the most modem weaponry. Its two divisions are geared 
towards a rapid deployment strategy complete with air-
borne troops and modern infantry equipment. Key posi-
tions after the reshuffle have gone to Kostrad officers no-
tably Lt-General Sugiono who was promoted to the pres-
tigious position of Kasum ABRJ, ABRI Chief of General 
Affairs. Another Kostrad stalwart, Major-General Ryam-
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izard Ryacudu was given the difficult post of military 
commander of Brawijaya, the East Java Military Com-
mand. Lt. General Johny Lumintang was appointed to the 
post of deputy army chief-of-staff. 
Demotions for the Prabowo group 
To speak about the 'Prabowo group' is not entirely ac-
curate because Prabowo made coalitions with a wide range 
of political tendencies. One tendency within ABRI that was 
sidelined was the so-called ABRI Hijau, the green ABRI. 
This tendency is seen as part of the 'structural' Muslim 
groups, a relatively new phenomenon in ABRI politics. 
ABRI hijau is contrasted with the more mainstream ABRI 
officers, often called ABRI Merah-Putih or the red-and-
white ABRI, named after the Indonesian flag. General Wi-
ranto is regarded as the main representative of ABRI 
Merah-Putih. 
Key officers of ABRI Hijau have all been removed from 
the top, notably Lt-General Fachrul Razi, the former chief 
of general affairs and now given a bureaucratic post as sec-
retary-general at the defence ministry. Another key post 
held by a ABRI Hijau stalwart, Major-General Zacky An-
war Makarim, director of the intelligence agency, BIA, has 
been taken over by Major-General Tyasno Sudarto. Major-
General Zacky Anwar Makarim joins the ranks of an in-
creasing number of senior officers seconded to Cilangkap 
without a proper function. 
Major-General Djoko Subroto, military commander of 
the East Java Brawijaya Command, also part of the ABRI 
Hijau core, was shifted to the powerless post of inspector-
general of ABRI. Another notorious ABRI Hijau stalwart, 
Major-General Kivlan Zein has been despatched to the ob-
scure post as member of the team of advisors to the army 
chief-of-staff. Political tabloids in Jakarta report that both 
Djoko Subroto and Kivlan Zein have been directly in-
volved in sinister political games. Apparently Djoko Sub-
roto endorsed the mysterious killings of Muslim leaders in 
East Java while Kivlan Zein, was seen in Jakarta com-
manding para-military units during the MPR, the People's 
Assembly, session last November. 
For several years Prabowo was also commander of the 
notorious Kopassus, the red beret commando unit. The 
ambitious Prabowo used Kopassus to boost his career. 
Kopassus had always been the 'creme de la creme' of 
ABRI but under the command of Prabowo it really went to 
the extremes. Kopassus members enjoyed better facilities, 
drove better cars, had better housing and even had their 
own shopping mall. Kopassus officers dominated Cilang-
kap. Prabowo openly showed ambitions to become the 
number one in ABRI. In the hectic days before Suharto's 
downfall, an open conflict emerged between Wiranto and 
Prabowo. Troops from both sides were roaming in the 
streets of Jakarta. The real story hasn't been revealed yet, 
because everybody in ABRI is tight-lipped about this af-
fair. The end of the story: Prabowo lost and three months 
later he was discharged from the army. With him, other key 
Kopassus stalwarts were dismissed, notably Major General 
Sjafrie Sjamsudin, the military commander of Jakarta, 
Major General Muchdi, the Kopassus commander and 
some middle ranking Kopassus officers. They were in-
volved in many sinister games, including the kidnapping of 
activists (see item on trial]. The ABRI top is frantically 
reorganising Kopassus to get this elite squad back on 
track. 
ARMED FORCES 
The only important Prabowo soul-mate left is Four-star 
General Subagyo, clinging to the post of Chief-of-Staff.He 
is the only key Kopassus officer left from the Prabowo-
gang. Kopassus consist of 6,000 soldiers and it was obvi-
ously not possible for the Cilangkap mainstream to alienate 
Kopassus too much. It is a public secret that Wiranto and 
Subagyo can't get along very well. Lt General Johny Lu-
mintang, also a Kopassus officer but on Wiranto's side, 
has been put by Wiranto in the position of Deputy Chief of 
Staff. To keep an eye on Subagyo, observers say. 
ABRl's political role 
Demands for an end to the dwifungsi, the dual function 
doctrine of ABRI, continue to be voiced. Most opposition 
groups put this high on their agendas. ABRI has been 
forced to retreat somewhat but ABRI' s dominance in Indo-
nesia's political life in the last three decades has been so 
overwhelming that it will take some time before it can 
really end. The ABRI reformers are agreed that they need 
to make further retreats, such as ABRI officers in civilian 
posts gradually handing over to civilians who have been 
democratically elected, notably in the regional administra-
tion. 
ABRI has also officially announced its withdrawal from 
Golkar, the government party, something that would have 
been difficult to imagine in the Suharto era. A group of 
retired generals have decided to leave Golkar and estab-
lished a new political party. The leader of the new party is 
retired General Edi Sudradjat, previously ABRI Com-
mander-in-Chief and also ex-Minister of Defence: 
The removal of ABRI from political life is a continuous 
process that will gather speed as civil society becomes 
stronger. But this is easier said than done. In a country 
heading towards destabilisation on so many fronts, ABRI 
will continue to play a dominant role in society. The strug-
gle to drive ABRI back to the barracks is far from over. * 
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Trial of Kopassus abductors a farce 
The trial of eleven members of Kopassus, the army's special forces, for kidnapping pro-de1!'ocracy 
activists during the closing months of the Suharto regime has been condemned by human rights ac-
tivists, some of the abducted victims and the families of thirteen missing men as a farce and a cover-
up for those truly responsible. The National Human Rights Commission and others have called the 
trial an abuse of human rights and said it should be abandoned. 
Altogether 23 pro-democracy activists were abducted 
during the closing months of 1997 and in early 1998. Nine 
of the abducted men were later released and some publicly 
testified about their horrifying experiences. One of the ab-
ducted men was found dead while the other thirteen are 
still unaccounted for. 
Role of Prabowo ignored 
The stunning injustice of this trial lies in the fact that 
following an army investigation undertaken last August 
into the abductions, the armed forces commander-in-chief, 
General Wiranto announced his decision to discharge Lt-
General Prabowo, son-in-law of the now-deposed dictator 
Suharto, who was the commander of Kopassus, the elite 
commandos of the army, at the time of the abductions. 
Amazingly, however, this was an 'honorable' discharge 
and it was not followed by a decision to place Prabowo 
under arrest and formally charge him. General Wiranto 
said at the time that charges might be preferred against 
Prabowo, but this did not happen. On the contrary, shortly 
after his discharge. Prabowo left the country in a cloud of 
secrecy and subsequently turned up in Jordan where he is 
now living in permanent exile under the protection of his 
close friend, King Abdullah. 
In stark contrast to the findings of the army's investiga-
tions, the eleven men now on trial before a military court 
are said in the indictment to have acted on their own initia-
tive. Furthermore, it implies that they were justified in what 
they did because they were acting in the interests of safe-
guarding national stability, under threat from a bunch of 
'radicals'. The eleven accused include one major, seven 
captains and three sergeants. 
Moreover, the indictment fails to make any mention of 
the torture to which the abducted men were subjected, nor 
does it hold the accused officers responsible for the thirteen 
abductees whose fate still remains a mystery. The indict-
ment concerns itself solely with the nine men who were 
released. 
Four of the abducted men have been called as witnesses 
but they have announced that they will refuse to testify in 
protest at the unsatisfactory nature of the indictment. They 
said they will not collaborate with any proceedings until 
the thirteen missing men are released or an account is made 
of what has happened to them. 
The chairman of the National Human Rights Commis-
sion, Marzuki Darusman, has also roundly condemned the 
trial as unfair and a violation of human rights, and has 
called for it to be halted. 'The whole trial is staged and 
designed to minimise the damage done to ABRI and it 
seems it will lead to a miscarriage of justice,' Marzuki said. 
[Jakarta Post, 2 January 1999] w '_ ~- '~ J;- · :,;,2v~ 
Wiranto is clearly bent on closing ranks within the 
armed forces and has decided to mount a show trial of 
lower ranks while protecting people like Prabowo and Su-
harto. The trial has nothing to do with ending impunity that 
members of the armed forces have enjoyed since Suharto 
came to power in 1965. 
Political significance of the abductions 
One of the most outspoken of the abducted men, Pius 
Lustrilangang, strongly condemned the failure of the 
prosecutor to charge the accused with torture. 'For the 
whole time we were held, we were tortured night and day, 
beaten, tortured with lighted cigarettes, electricity and other 
things.' 
He said that it was unacceptable for the men to be in-
dicted on criminal charges. 'The abductions were part of a 
plan drawn up by Suharto to sustain himself in power. We 
were abducted because we were protesting against his re-
appointment as president so it was part and parcel of Su-
harto's political intrigues.' He was convinced that Suharto 
was the one who gave the order and that the armed forces 
commander in chief General Wiranto cannot evade respon-
sibility for the abductions.[Wawasan, 24 December 1998] 
Pius emerged from his abduction in April last year and 
despite the trauma and the personal risks he exposed him-
self to, he spoke out about his terrible experiences at a 
press conference in Jakarta and almost immediately went to 
Washington to testify before members of Congress. 
The head of Kontras, the Commission for the Disap-
pears and to Combat Violence, Munir, believes that other 
elements within the armed forces besides Kopassus were 
also involved in the abductions, including the Jakarta mili-
tary command and has insisted throughout that the trial 
should not take place until all the missing men have been 
accounted for. * 
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Indicting Suharto 
The proceedings against General Pinochet of Chile for crimes committed while he was head of state 
have focused world attention on the need to bring dictators to justice. A campaign is developing to 
have Suharto indicted for the crimes against humanity perpetrated by his New Order regime. 
It is an affront to justice that the former dictator has 
been allowed to slip into comfortable retirement without 
being held responsible for the many atrocities committed 
during his 32-year despotic rule. Although there have been 
persistent calls for him to be tried for corruption and other 
economic crimes, that appears unlikely to happen while the 
present power holders remain in position. 
The trial of Suharto and other senior or retired armed 
forces officers for crimes against humanity is now essen-
tial. (Other international criminal charges, such as geno-
cide and war crimes are also possible, but may be techni-
cally more difficult to prosecute.) 
A trial should serve several purposes. It should satisfy 
the need for punishment, deterrence and belated justice for 
the many victims and help heal the wounds inflicted by 32 
years of brutal repression. It should also contribute to the 
Indonesian people's understanding of their recent past and 
the ideologies and power structures which lay behind the 
massive violations of human rights committed by the Su-
harto regime. This understanding is a pre-requisite to the 
building of a democratic future based on justice and fun-
damental human rights. 
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Growing demands for indictment 
The international focus on the case against Pinochet has 
led several lawyers and commentators in Indonesia to call 
for Suharto's indictment. On 15 January, five lndone-
sian human rights organisations petitioned the National 
Commission on Human Rights (Komnas Ham) to conduct 
a comprehensive investigation into his crimes. This is an 
important initiative, but it remains to be seen whether 
Komnas Ham will respond positively. 
In Yogyakarta, Central Java, a group of former PKI 
prisoners has started to investigate the 1965 killings in that 
area with a view to establishing a database of evidence 
against Suharto. 
Moves have also been made by the Portuguese section 
of the International Commission of Jurists to have Suharto 
extradited to Portugal for crimes in East Timor. That ini-
tiative is, however, likely to fail since there is no extradi-
tion treaty between Portugal and Indonesia and Suharto 
will be wary of travelling to a third country which might 
extradite him. In any event, Portuguese groups may now 
consider it prudent to desist from any action which might 
antagonise the Indonesian Government at this sensitive 
time in negotiations on the future of East Tim or. 
Possible mechanisms 
It is important that Indonesian groups take the lead in 
the campaign to indict Suharto and their initiatives should 
be watched closely and supported from abroad. ideally, 
Suharto should be called to account before an lndonesian 
tribunal, but if that does not prove possible, there are sev-
eral options at the international level. 
The Pinochet precedent - according to which a Spanish 
judge has compiled a series of 'charges relating to offences 
committed against Spanish citizens - could be used, but it 
is most applicable to East Timorese citizens living in Por-
tugal of Australia. In their case, it may not advisable for 
the reasons stated above. 
The Permanent International Criminal Court established 
by the UN in June 1998 is not an option since it cannot 
deal with crimes committed before it was set up. However, 
an ad hoc tribunal similar to those relating to the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda might be possible if sufficient 
international political will can be generated and if a new 
Indonesian regime can be persuaded to acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of such a tribunal. There is a recent precedent 
in the case of Cambodia. Following a resolution by the UN 
General Assembly, a team of experts recently visited the 
country to investigate crimes committed by the Khmer 
Rouge. The Cambodian Prime Minister has accepted the 
establishment of an international tribunal as long as it oper-
ates outside the country. 
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At present, the indictment of Suharto is not high on the 
list of priorities of the international community, and key 
players, such as the US and the UK, may be reluctant to 
provide support in view of their complicity in some of Su-
harto's most heinous crimes. 
For this reason, it is necessary for campaigners to con-
centrate initially on raising the profile of Suharto as a brutal 
dictator and on shaming the international community into 
taking action against him. 
Raising awareness 
Following the Pinochet case, commentators and legal 
experts have speculated on the possible trials of other noto-
rious criminals such as Idi Amin, 'Baby Doc' Duvalier, 
and Saddam Hussein but little has been said about Suharto. 
The scale of his crimes has not yet entered into interna-
tional consciousness. 
Ironically, Suharto's anti-communist purge in the 1960s 
was considered to be such an admirable precedent by Pino-
chet's troops that they scrawled the warning 'Jakarta is 
coming' on the walls of the presidential palace during the 
1973 coup against Salvador Allende. Even then, the vio-
lence they unleashed, resulting in more than 3,000 deaths 
and disappearances, was nothing compared to that inflicted 
by the Suharto regime on its hundreds of thousands of 
murder victims. 
One means of raising awareness is the establishment of 
an Alternative International Tribunal similar to the Ber-
trand Russell tribunal set up to investigate Vietnam War 
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atrocities. This will need the support of partners such as 
the International Commission of Jurists and the US-based 
Centre for Constitutional Rights, which successfully sued 
Major-General Sintong Pandjaitan in relation to the murder 
of Kamal Bamadaj, a Malaysian student during the Santa 
Cruz massacre in East Timor. 
Power and impunity 
Proceedings against Suharto should also help to curb 
the malign influence he continues to exert over everyday 
political events, and undermine some of the enduring 
power structures founded on his patronage network and the 
privileged position of the armed forces. 
Unless action is taken against him, Suharto's continued 
freedom and impunity will remain a dangerous source of 
instability at this crucial time in Indonesia's democratic 
development. Followers of Suharto have been linked with 
much of the violence which has shaken the country in re-
cent months. In particular, a close friend and ally, Yorrys 
Raweyai, who heads the Pemuda Pancasila youth group 
has been questioned about his involvement in provoking 
recent religious rioting in Ambon, which has so far claimed 
well over 100 lives [see separate item]. 
Meanwhile press reports have indicated that the Suharto 
family is funding up to 70 political parties in an attempt to 
influence the June elections and prevent his eventual trial. 
TAPOL intends to play a prominent role in the cam-
paign to indict Suharto over the next 12 months and 
comments and offers of support from our readers will be 
much appreciated. • 
Online 
lV"'"' .gn.apc.org/ta pol 
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the ne''' T APOL website for all the 
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human rights situation in Indonesia 
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previous bulletins, press releases, the 
texts of T APOL reports and briefing 
papers and a list of publications. 
Bookmark it no\v! 
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Governments shamed by TV programmes 
In January, two powerful television programmes - 'The Mark Thomas Comedy Product' and 'The 
Timor Conspiracy' by John Pilger - caused acute official embarrassment by eliciting admissions of 
torture by the Indonesians and exposing continuing British complicity in Indonesian repression 
through its arms sales policy. 
At an arms fair in Greece, Major General Agus 
Widjojo, the Chief of Indonesia's Staff and Command 
School and formerly the Assistant of General Planning, 
admitted to the Mark Thomas team that torture is practised 
by the armed forces. 'We did some tortures to protect the 
security of society', he said. 
Mark Thomas - a stand-up comedian whose dramatised 
stunts have exposed many uncomfortable truths about those 
in power - had set up a fake company to provide public 
relations advice to the arms industry on how to respond to 
negative publicity about human rights. 
His meeting with Widjojo led to a session with the 
defence attache to the Indonesian embassy in London, 
Colonel Halim, who confirmed that torture is used and 
volunteered the information that the Indonesian army is 
using Saracen and Saladin armoured vehicles, made by the 
UK company Alvis, in East Timar. The British 
Government has always refused to admit that British 
military equipment is used in East Timar. 
The programme also included a conversation, recorded 
in Greece, with Paul Greenwood, the military business 
director of Pains Wessex, a UK company based in 
Salisbury. He described how officials from the Department 
of Trade and Industry have no qualms about UK 
companies selling equipment via licensed production 
facilities in third countries (thereby avoiding UK export 
licensing regulations) and said: 'Just as long as we're not 
shipping in the UK, they don't give a toss.' Pains Wessex 
has in the past supplied tear gas to Indonesia. 
The Timor Conspiracy 
John Pilger' s updated version of his 1994 Death of a 
Nation reminded us once again of the British 
Government's complicity in the tragedy of East Timar. In 
the face of official cynicism, the British public registered 
its solidarity with the East Timorese people by telephoning 
in their thousands after the programme. Over 200,000 call 
attempts were made. 
New footage included Robin Cook, then Labour's front 
bench spokesman on foreign affairs, saying in 1994 'Hawk 
aircraft - made by British Aerospace - have been observed 
on bombing raids since 1984'. 
Current Foreign Office Minister Derek Fatchett 
displayed depressingly familiar sophistry by evading 
Pilger's questions about arms export licences granted by 
the Labour Government and by asserting that the 
Government does not have the power to revoke a licence 
for the export of more Hawk aircraft granted by the 
Conservatives in November 1996. His assertion is wrong. 
The power to revoke licences is set out clearly in the export 
control legislation. For reasons which have never been 
fully explained, the Government has abdicated 
responsibility and refused to exercise that power. 
Parliamentary responses 
Questioned by MPs about the Mark Thomas 
revelations, ministers resorted to their favourite tactic of 
blaming previous governments. The armoured vehicles 
being used in East Timor were, they said, exported in the 
1960s and 'no formal mechanisms exist for monitoring the 
use of British defence equipment once it has been 
exported'. 
This failure to monitor previously-exported equipment 
is a clear dereliction of the Government's duty. Indonesia 
has given assurances to the British Government as a 
sovereign entity (not to a government in power at a 
particular time) that equipment will not be used for internal 
repression or deployed in East Timar. The present 
government has a duty to ensure that those assurances are 
not broken irrespective of who granted the licence. 
Meanwhile a parliamentary written answer to Ann 
Clwyd revealed that a further 25 export licences were 
granted for military exports to Indonesia in the period 11 
May 1998 to 31 December 1998. A total of 92 licences 
have now been granted since Labour came to power. Only 
seven have been refused. 
At the end of last year, two parliamentary reports - the 
Trade and Industry Committee's report on 'Strategic 
Export Controls' and the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
report on 'Foreign Policy and Human Rights' - were 
published and cited submissions made by TAPOL. The 
Foreign Affairs Committee took particular account of our 
criticism of the Government's 'constructive partnership' 
with Indonesia under Suharto. The Committee criticised 
the implementation of this policy, saying it ' ... seems to 
have been seriously flawed, as the Government continued 
to work actively ... with the corrupt and moribund regime of 
Suharto until his overthrow.' 
The Trade and Industry Committee's report reserved 
judgement on the efficacy of the Government's new export 
licensing criteria until the publication of the long-awaited 
annual report on arms exports. This continues to be 
delayed with the latest excuse being that Customs and 
Excise got their facts wrong. Presumably the spin doctors 
are also having trouble putting the necessary gloss on the 
report. Further developments are awaited. * 
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Dialogue in West Papua faces obstruction 
An initiative taken by many NGOs, tribal leaders and the Protestant and Catholic churches in West 
Papua to enter into dialogue with the government in Jakarta about the future of West Papua is being 
met with obstruction and manipulation by the authorities. This could result in renewed confronta-
tion in the territory where the pressure for fundamental change has greatly intensified since the 
downfall of Suharto. 
The idea of entering into dialogue with the central gov-
ernment as a way of reducing tensions emerged in the 
wake of a number of flag-raising incidents last year. Rais-
ing the West Papuan flag has long been a traditional form 
of peaceful struggle by West Papuans in defiance of their 
country's annexation as Indonesia's province of 'Irian 
Jaya' . Flag-raising ceremonies in Manokwari, Sorong, and 
Wamena last year reached a climax when the West Papuan 
flag was raised and kept aloft for five days in the harbour 
of Biak at the beginning of July 1998. The army responded 
with a brutal assault which left an unknown number of 
people dead and many injured. 
The army regional commander, Major-General Amir 
Sembiring declared that such activities would be regarded 
as acts of treason and treated accordingly, and the leader of 
the Biak action, Filipe Yakob Samuel Karma, was tried 
and sentenced to six years for rebellion. Meanwhile, those 
responsible for the shooting and killing of perhaps scores 
of people in Biak's harbour have not been called to ac-
count. 
Calls for a national dialogue 
The initiative for a dialogue with the central govern-
ment was taken by FORERI, the Forum for the Recon-
ciliation of Irian Jaya Society, which was set up in 
Jayapura on 24 July last year. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 
148, September 1998] 
The dialogue initiative was first mooted when a fact-
finding team from the Indonesian Parliament visited West 
Papua in July following the outcry provoked by the killings 
in Biak. The call was renewed at a seminar in Jakarta on l 
August, at which West Papuans suggested that the dialogue 
should be followed by an international dialogue involving 
the UN. The way in which the UN sealed the territory's 
fate following the farcical 'Act of Free Choice' in 1969 has 
rankled with West Papuans ever since and is now being 
openly discussed in the Indonesian national press. [See for 
instance, 'Human rights violations continue in Irian Jaya' 
by Yohanis G. Bonay, in The Jakarta Post, 17 December 
1998.] 
The idea received a cautious welcome from the Habibie 
administration and his Secretary of State, Akbar Tanjung, 
who is also General Chairman of GOLKAR, was put in 
charge of making the arrangements. Initially, it was an-
nounced that the dialogue would take place when President 
Habibie made a visit to the territory in January for an un-
connected event. But disagreements soon emerged over the 
Demonstration of Papuans in front of the US Embassy in 
Jakarta. Besides protesting against human rights abuses, 
they also called/or a review of Freeport's contract. 
agenda. While West Papuans made it clear that they 
wanted an open agenda, with all the options - autonomy, 
federation and independence - on the table, the government 
began to dither and the January talks did not take place. 
When Akbar Tanjung announced that month that the 
dialogue with Habibie would take place 'after !di/ Fitri' 
(the end of Ramadhan on 19-20 January), and that the 
framework would be Irian's retention within the Indone-
sian Republic, a highly sceptical Protestant minister from 
Timika, Rev. Nato Gobay, wondered whether he meant 
this year's !du! Fitri or next year's. The Bishop of 
Jayapura, Mgr Leo Laba Ladjar said the dialogue was 
needed 'to find out why Irianese demand independence 
from Indonesia'. [The Jakarta Post, 23 January] 
Groups in the different regions meanwhile are appoint-
ing their delegations to the dialogue in anticipation of it 
taking place. In Manokwari, the 20-person delegation will 
be headed by the bupati or district chief, William A. Ra-
mar. He and others made representations to the National 
Human Rights Commission in Jakarta, seeking a guarantee 
that these preparations for the dialogue could proceed 
without fear and intimidation. After it became known that 
the Manokwari delegation would express the local com-
munity's desire to secede from Indonesia, delegation mem-
bers had been subjected to terror and intimidation. 
[Kompas, 15 January] 
Another way of countering the pro-independence up-
surge is the activities of Yulian Yap Marey, a former 
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member of the armed resistance, the OPM, who has since 
fallen under the army's wing, to persuade villagers not to 
support independence. Following a visit to a border village, 
near Skouw, villagers are reported to have said that all they 
were interested in was getting their basic needs, not dis-
cussing independence. Marey is also working hard to bring 
together ' traditional leaders ' from all districts to support 
the idea of 'otonomisasi' or autonomy. The decision will 
be published in book form and circulated through the ter-
ritory. 'What I am stressing to the entire community is that 
we should forget about independence and focus on pre-
paring for a better future through autonomy,' said Marey. 
[Cendrawasih Pos, 15 December 1998.] 
Those connected with FORERI see this as a campaign 
being engineered by the army to roll back the tide of opin-
ion in favour of independence. 
The Council of the Amungme tribal people, Lemasa, 
declared that it could not accept a government proposal to 
call the dialogue a silaturahmi or 'social get-together' and 
said it would not take part if the government failed to stop 
the manipulations of the local government and the armed 
forces which were causing confusion and splitting the 
community. [See resolution adopted by the Lemasa con-
gress in December 1998.] 
Another source of disruption is the involvement of Yor-
rys Raweyai, a West Papuan who chairs Pemuda Pan-
casila, a highly-suspect youth organisation closely allied to 
the Suharto family which is being used to provoke social 
clashes in various parts of the country (see separate item on 
the unrest in Ambon). Yorrys has managed somehow to 
win the confidence of the FORERI branch in Jakarta. Al-
though a staunch supporter of the New Order regime and 
all its basic political principles, he has recently taken the 
initiative in several demonstrations in favour of a free West 
Papua which can only be seen as provocative. 
OPM and the dialogue 
The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) which has been 
waging armed struggle in West Papua since 1965 has sig-
nalled its willingness to shift its emphasis to a political 
strategy and is clearly anxious to be part of the national 
dialogue. Last year, the OPM commander, Mathias Wenda, 
put out feelers to the regional military commander about a 
ceasefire between the two forces. This drew a cautious re-
sponse from Major-General Amir Sembiring although there 
has been no confirmation of a ceasefire having been 
agreed. 
In mid February, an 18-person OPM delegation arrived 
in Jayapura hoping to enter into talks with the military 
commander. The delegation included the secretary-general 
and the chief-of-staff of the OPM as well as the wife of 
Mathias Wenda. As we went to press, it was not clear 
whether the talks would go ahead. The members of the 
delegation were staying at a hotel in Jayapura and had met 
several officers of the military command on an informal 
basis. [Cendrawasih Pos, 19 February] 
The 1969 'act of free choice' 
Engineering opinion in West Papua has been a hallmark 
of Indonesian activities ever since Indonesian officials first 
set foot in West Papua in the early 1960s and reached its 
climax in 1969, during the so-called 'act of free choice'. 
One of the Jakarta-appointed members of the council of 
1025 'traditional chiefs' who took the unanimous decision 
on 2 August 1969 that West Papua should remain a part of 
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Indonesia recently described the heavy-handed pressure 
they were under to adopt the ' right' decision. The Rev. 
Origenes Hokujoku, who was one of the 101 council mem-
bers selected to 'represent' the capital, Soekamopura as it 
was then called, recalls how it happened: 
Three weeks before the referendum, the members were 
isolated. Instructors continually pressured them to vote for 
integration with Indonesia. The members were given a 
piece of paper with exact instructions on what to say. '/ 
remember we had a final rehearsal to see if we mastered 
our speeches. One man resisted, he refased to present the 
obligatory speech. The next morning, his body was found 
in a gorge. General Ali Murtopo (who was in charge of the 
so-called referendum) tried to placate me ... but on other 
occasions he mocked me, saying: "The Americans have 
landed on the moon. Why not ask them for a piece of moon 
for the Papuans. "' 
'We have been let down by the world, by the United 
Nations, we have been denied a free choice. ' [Algemeen 
Dagblad, 12 December 1998] 
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Habibie and the question of West Papua 
Now that President Habibie has said on no uncertain 
terms that he wants to be rid of East Timor (see separate 
item), how is this likely to reflect on his attitude towards 
the equally legitimate demand for independence for West 
Papua? 
The answer is, not much, if at all. For the post-Suharto 
administration in Jakarta under Habibie, East Timor has 
been seen as a endless drain on economic resources with 
little coming in to the state coffers (apart from what may 
soon be coming in from exploitation of Timor Gap oil) 
whilst being a diplomatic nightmare. On the other hand, 
West Papua is a huge source of revenue and foreign ex-
change as the exploitation of its abundant resources goes 
on without stop, whereas the international community still 
fails to acknowledge the huge injustice perpetrated against 
the West Papuans in 1969. Therefore, Habibie can afford to 
ignore the pressures now building up in the territory and 
rely on the army to keep things in check. 
Habibie moreover has his own economic interests, hav-
ing dreamed up a huge project to develop hydro-power, to 
support heavy industries and agro-industries in the Mam-
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beramo watershed, for which he has been actively seeking 
investment from foreign partners in Germany and else-
where. If it goes ahead, the project will destroy a huge area 
of pristine forests and swamplands while dispossessing 
several thousand indigenous people. 
Habibie has also succumbed to pressure from Jim-Bob 
Moffet, the executive-director of the Orleans-based parent 
company of the mammoth copper-and-gold mining com-
pany, Freeport for the go-ahead from Jakarta to expand its 
output from the present 160,000 metric tons to 300,000 
metric tons per day, regardless of the devastating impact on 
the local environment. Habibie's decision has caused fric-
tion within his own cabinet, with the Minister for Mines, 
Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, insisting on holding out for an 
increase in the royalties paid by the company and other 
obligations. 
Freeport in the eyes of the Amungme 
But the controversy between senior officials in Jakarta 
is taking place without consulting the local people whose 
land was seized against their wishes and who have suffered 
degradation of their environment ever since. At best, they 
offer a new law on autonomy which will increase the pro-
portion of wealth returned to regions where it was earned, 
where it will be administered by regional officials, not by 
those whose lands were expropriated. 
At a congress of the Amungme tribal council, Lemasa, 
in December last year, a resolution accused the US multi-
national of failing to pay proper attention to their demand 
for justice and warned that if this continued, 'Lemasa will 
take peaceful action to bring to an end Freeport's activities 
throughout Amungsa'. The resolution also said that the 
council's lawsuit filed against the company in the New 
Orleans district court, Lousiana state, would continue. It 
urged the company to enter into genuine and fair negotia-
tions on an equal footing with Lemasa. 
Responding to the news of Habibie's agreement with 
Moffet, Tom Beanal who chairs the Lemasa Council, con-
demned it because of 'the devastating impact the expansion 
(of output) will have on us living around the mining 
field .... People in Jakarta have never asked our opinion. 
The government has never allowed the Irianese people to 
think. If we protest their decision, they will send troops to 
kill us.' [The Jakarta Post, 30 January 1999] 
Trials 
The man who led the flag-raising ceremony in Biak 
from 2 - 6 July last year, Filipe Yacob Samuel Karma, 
42, who had held a senior position in the regional admini-
stration, has been sentenced to six years and six months for 
rebellion, on charges of 'separatism'. During his trial, hun-
dreds of supporters packed the court-room and after the 
verdict was announced on 1 January, they marched through 
the streets of B iak to the prison where he was being held, 
singing hymns and shouting slogans against the Indonesian 
government and the security forces. 
Two days after he was sentenced, Karma was suddenly 
taken from his cell in Biak Prison and bundled into a heli-
copter for transfer to a prison in Jayapura. The prisoner 
demanded to see the transfer instruction before agreeing to 
be moved, out of fear that he might be being kidnapped. A 
scuffle occurred during which a serious gunshot wound in 
the leg which he sustained when he and his colleagues 
were defending the West Papuan flag was re-opened. He 
was naked by the time his assailants dragged him out of the 
cell. He was taken hand-cuffed and under heavy guard to 
Jayapura. The reason for the transfer is not clear. 
Meanwhile, in Wamena, the capital of the district of 
Jayawijaya in the central highlands, ten people identified 
only by their initials, have gone on trial for their involve-
ment in a flag-raising ceremony in Wamena on 7 July last 
year. One of the defendants is a 14-year old boy. They face 
charges that carry a maximum sentence of life imprison-
ment. 
Meanwhile, a senior police official in Jayapura has an-
nounced that the documents relating to charges against 
Theus Eluay, the highly-respected chief of the Sentani 
tribe, have been delivered to the public prosecutor. Theus 
and others who were arrested with him last October are 
likely to face charges of rebellion. Shortly after his arrest, 
Theus was released into house arrest, in an apparent move 
to reduce protest at the arrest of such a widely-respected 
figure. Shortly before his arrest, Theus was appointed head 
of the Conference of All Tribal Peoples of Irian Jaya, 
making him a man of great influence in society. It remains 
to be seen whether the authorities will ever see fit to put 
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